Introduction
God help them tonight in the hour of their affliction Praying for him who they'll ne'er meet again Hear the poor orphans tell their sad story Father was killed by the Pinkerton men.
- The moment is at hand for corporate interests and public law enforcement to make a . . . gesture and forge a professional bond. Its creation would serve the welfare of all citizens by producing farreaching benefits for American policing.
-Michael G. Shanahan, Private Enterprise and the Public Police: The Professionalizing Effects of a New Partnership
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What do Disneyland, the Abu Ghraib U.S. military prison, the Mall of America, and the Y-12 nuclear security complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee have in common? These places have wildly different purposes (civil defense, recreation) and identities (public, private, or quasi-private). Yet there is a commonality: each employs private police. 4 Less obvious is that this answer-indicative of the prevalence and numbers of private police today-would have stunned an observer from the vantage point of the late-nineteenth century. Surely, our time traveler would remark, the dominance of private policing represents the failure of the state, and a crisis in public confidence. Yet that reaction would seem odd 360 Elizabeth Joh ing. 9 Thus, while it may be convenient to speak of a notable lack of regulation over private police as a regulatory lapse, 10 the state here is also taking a stance toward private policing, through its failure to act.
The discussion that follows examines the shifting status of private policing: first, by examining the history of skepticism and criticism directed at them during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, particularly in media attention and in congressional investigations; second, by recounting the partnership model that first gained a foothold in studies sponsored by the federal government in the 1970s and 1980s; and third, by questioning the meaning and intentions behind the idea of partnership advanced today.
None of the historical moments examined here can be characterized as wholly critical or entirely positive. Nor do the attitudes described here represent the unified efforts of one group or individual. If anything, each critical moment, viewed with the benefit of hindsight, represents but one choice over other possibilities. Indeed, the evolution of public attitudes toward private policing demonstrates that the emerging conventional wisdom of partnership was hardly an inevitable result. We can extend this observation further: The history of private police entanglement in unsavory events suggests that the increased adoption of these partnerships will likewise see its own share of problems.
I. The Emergence of Private Policing as a Threat
From their emergence in the nineteenth century as competitors of the public police, to their targeting by congressional investigation in the early-twentieth century, private police have been the recipients of criticism and rebuke. Their very existence, as this section shows, raised fundamental doubts about the ability of the state to take care of its own citizens.
A. Competing with the New Public Police
The slow establishment of public police departments in American cities of the nineteenth century, 11 and the even slower turn toward a professional, highly-9. I have very loosely adapted this idea from Howard Becker's observations on the involvement of the state in art. See Howard S. Becker, Art Worlds 165-91 (1982) .
10. Cf. Joh, supra note 4, at 107-09 (describing the paucity of current regulation on private police behavior).
11. See Eric H. Monkkonen, Police in Urban America, 1860-1920, at 42 (1981) (citing the gradual transition from a constable-watch system to the establishment of public police departments in Boston, 1838-59; in New York, 1843-53; and in Cincinnati, 1848-59).
trained police force, 12 led many people to rely upon the services of private detective agencies and watchmen services. 13 The average public patrol officer of the late-nineteenth century was well-paid compared to other skilled urban workers, but poorly trained, if at all.
14 Moreover, his 15 relative isolation while working his "beat," compounded by the lack of technological means to communicate with the precinct station house, encouraged behavior that relied more on wits and practical experience than on formal law. 16 Deficient, too, in the eyes of many urban dwellers were the small number of available public officers, made even less helpful by their poor organization. 17 Urban residents in particular were already acquainted with an informal, private system for the retrieval of stolen property, operated by the constabulary, 12 . See, e.g., Samuel Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform: The Emergence of Professionalism 56-57 (1977) (arguing that the signs of professionalism in policing, such as journals and organizations, did not completely emerge until the twentieth century).
13. There appears to be no reliable source for estimating the number of private police in the United States in the nineteenth century, save for the records of a few companies and the occasional newspaper report. Before a congressional investigative committee, Robert Pinkerton of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency said that his company employed 600 persons, but this number included guards, detectives, clerks, and stenographers. See H. R. Rep for a fee. 18 In the era before the "new" police were established, constables found little contradiction in simultaneously performing what we would think of today as private and public duties. Constables developed mutually agreeable relationships with a new class of "underworld" informers: the provision of information meant no arrest.
19 When these constables became incorporated into the fledgling public police departments, many victims of property crime continued to offer discreet rewards to them for the return of stolen goods.
20 After a number of wellpublicized scandals, however, state courts moved to prohibit the availability of a reward system to the public police.
21
Yet the concept of private compensation for police work did not disappear. Many former constables responded to legal prohibitions on rewards by forming, in the 1840s, private organizations of "Independent Policemen" that targeted pickpockets and burglars.
22 By the 1860s, for ten to twelve dollars a week, banks and other businesses could engage the services of private investigators to test their employees' honesty. 23 Without the protection of a national police force, 26 railroad companies like the Illinois Central, Michigan Central, Michigan Southern, and others-necessarily crossing multiple jurisdictional boundaries within their ordinary course of business-turned to private police firms. Of these, the most prominent was the detective agency founded by Allan Pinkerton in 1850. 27 Although they did not want for business, these private police were not free from criticism.
28 Some public officials complained of the perceived competition between private and public police, as did Chicago mayor John Wentworth (1857-58; 1860-61), for example, at his 1857 inaugural address. He stated:
Our police system has been gradually falling into disrepute; and it is a lamentable fact that, whilst our citizens are heavily taxed to support a large police force, a highly respectable private police is doing a lucrative business. Our citizens have ceased to look to the public police for protection, for the detection of culprits or the recovery of stolen property. Others more directly faulted the questionable methods employed by some private police officers. Newspaper accounts reported of "outrageous iniquities" perpetrated by private detectives in divorce cases, and of those who engaged in "sweating," or threatening, potential complainants from going to the public police about their clients. 30 Courts took notice of the poor reputation of private detectives. By the end of the 1880s, most states required the corroboration of a private detective's testimony before accepting it in matrimonial cases. 31 The highest court of New York state, for instance, observed in 1889 that the testimony of "prostitutes and private detectives" was to be given little weight in divorce cases.
32
B. "Knights of Capitalism"
33
After the Civil War, coal-mining, manufacturing, and steel-production companies turned to private police agencies like Pinkerton's not simply for property protection, but also to combat labor-related violence. This was no small task. The federal Department of Labor estimated that between 1881 and 1900, some 22,793 strikes had occurred throughout the country. 34 It was their role in quelling labor unrest that would bring private police their greatest disrepute until the time of the New Deal. 35 Of the private police services, the Pinkerton National Detective Agency played a leading role in providing these companies with employees to act as strike guards, "scabs" (substitute workers), undercover agents, and "strike missionaries." 36 In the period from 1866 to 1892, the Pinker- ton agency alone took part in seventy strikes. 37 By the end of the nineteenth century, "Pinkerton" had become a generic term for all private police.
38
Although the private police in all forms drew some criticism from the press during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, 39 the Homestead Riot of July 6, 1892-"an epic in labor history" 40 -proved to be a decisive moment of public scrutiny. Facing a strike by workers in his Homestead, Pennsylvania steel works, Henry Clay Frick of Carnegie Steel arranged to have some 300 Pinkerton guards travel by rail to Youngstown, Ohio, where they embarked on barges down the Monongahela River to Homestead. 41 Mistaking the guards for scabs, the striking workers engaged in exchanges of gunfire with the frightened Pinkerton guards (many of whom appear to have been misled about their assignment). 42 Three workers and seven guards were killed, and scores more were wounded. 43 Outnumbered, the Pinkerton guards surrendered, and were beaten by an angry mob. 44 State troops called by the state's governor occupied the plant without incident four days later. 38. Morn, supra note 26, at 102. 39. A number of states, responding to public antipathy to "Pinkerton men," passed laws between 1879 and 1911 that, for the most part, either prohibited the importation of guards from other states or forbade employment of armed guards within the state under specified circumstances. S. Rep. No. 76-6, pt. 1, at 14-17 (1939); see, e.g., Sowing Sharp Language, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1887, at 3 (reporting adoption by the State Trades Assembly in Albany of a resolution criticizing "a section of the mobilized army of Hessian murderers, known as the Pinkerton detectives" and stating that "there should be a law forbidding the employment of armed or unarmed men of any private police force for any purpose whatever"). 
C. Federal Investigations
National attention to Homestead 46 prompted investigations by Congress, although the House of Representatives had already begun to turn its attention to private policing before July of 1892. 47 In support of a House resolution to examine private policing, Representative William Jennings Bryan (1891-95) had declared in May that the protection of life and property "should not be transferred to private individuals and hired detectives until we are ready to acknowledge government a failure." 48 In November of 1892, a Senate committee, in hearings in Chicago, Pittsburgh, and New York, heard testimony not just from the Pinkerton agency but also from its competitors, including Thiel's Detective Service, the United States Detective Agency, Mooney and Boland Detective Agency, and the Illinois Detective Agency, about their role in policing labor unrest.
49
Both the House and Senate committees were highly critical of the use of private police against striking workers, but placed blame on the states for failing to provide public protection for the employers' unquestioned right to defend their private property. In its concluding statements, for example, the Senate investigative committee stated that the "use of private armed men is an assumption of the State's authority by private citizens." 50 "Anarchy" was inevitable where "the State is incapable of protecting its citizens in their rights of person and property . . . ."
51 Likewise, the report of the House of Representatives both reaffirmed the right to protect private property and condemned the "sloth and dilatoriness of the civil authorities to render efficient and prompt protection to persons and property." 52 46. See, e.g., Editorial, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1892, at 4 ("There is no doubt that the employment by capitalists of a large force of trained private police in case of trouble with workmen has a very exasperating effect. A force of this kind causes fierce antipathy where regular officers of the law might command respect and submission.").
47 The Homestead controversy did, however, midwife passage of the "Pinkerton law," 55 prohibiting the federal government and the District of Columbia from hiring any "employee of the Pinkerton Detective Agency, or similar agency," as well as similar provisions in the states. 56 Loopholes in these new laws, however, failed to prevent private police agencies from continuing to profit from laborrelated work. 57 Criticism had failed to materialize into restraint. (Of course, private police were not entirely free from legal scrutiny in this period. Pennsylvania courts appear to have been particularly wary of them, perhaps because the Homestead riot was so familiar. Some Pennsylvania state court judges, for example, denied applications for private detective licenses solely on the ground that there were too many in the profession already.) (Dauphin Co. 1921 ) ("It is quite possible that if a license were granted to each and every applicant complying with the requirements of the act, to say the least, a mmmmm each man to set up a government of his own at his own will."); The Homestead Case, 1 Pa. D. 785, 789 (1892) (stating that Carnegie Steel "had the undoubted right to protect its property"). As J. Bernard Hogg notes, however, the condemnation of private policing did not translate into greater sympathy for striking workers. See Hogg, supra note 40, at 195 (noting that "all classes were agreed on the inviolate rights of property and the sanctity of the individual right of contract").
After Homestead, Pinkerton's agency reduced its dependence upon strike work as a source of revenue, focusing instead on combating professional jewelry and banking theft, but newer agencies filled the needs of industry. 59 Frank Morn, in his historical account of the Pinkerton agency, describes the first two decades of the twentieth century as a "golden age" of the private police. 60 Their prosperity was not limited to strike work. The emergence of department stores that displayed goods on open shelves, for instance, brought with it increased rates of shoplifting. 61 In response, store owners often banded together to establish protective groups, like the Mutual Protective Association of New York, founded in 1919, which provided private detectives to member stores and maintained a "rogues' gallery" of repeat offenders. 62 Other individual stores had long employed their own police, such as Mary Plunkett, the "woman detective of New York City's Macy & Co." 63 Other private police agents stopped petty theft, patrolled rail yards, served warrants, protected small businesses, and even captured Army deserters for the federal government. 74 The Glenn E. Bodell Industrial Detectives company was one of many private police agencies that received a "flourishing business" in providing undercover agents and guards to employers in the Salinas, California, lettuce-packers' strike of 1936. 75 In Los Angeles, restaurant owners "followed the reprehensible practice of hiring municipal policemen for strike duty" in a 1937 strike against the Brown Derby restaurant.
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The Committee's conclusions were sweeping and condemnatory. The sole purpose of these "private police system[s]," 77 it concluded, was to "defend the interests of the employer, whether an individual or corporation"; any "exercise [of] the nonpartisan functions of guardian of the law" was "incidental." 78 The only legitimate role that a privately funded police agency could assume was the "protection of life and property."
79 Whenever private police exceeded these activities they "act[ed] only as an instrumentality of private economic policy." 80 The La Follette Committee drew a sharp contrast between the responsibilities and status of public and private police:
Public police systems are established by law. They are paid from public treasuries and are expected to be responsive to the requirements of entire communities. They must perform their duties impartially, without regard to the economic, racial, or religious status or views of the individual members of the community. 77. The Committee used the term "private police" in a specific sense: the creation by corporations of their own private guard and espionage departments "to achieve the same results obtainable through the employment of industrial detective and strikebreaking agencies." See S. Rep. No. 76-6, pt. 3, at 1 (1939). The Committee's views on these private police, however, are consistent with their views on private policing work offered by the detective agencies and employers associations they also studied.
78 As with the Homestead investigations, the reports of La Follette's committee resulted less in regulatory change than it did in reinforcing an unfavorable image of private policing. As one consequence, the Pinkerton Agency formally withdrew from all labor-related policing work in 1937. itorial questioned the right to defend one's property or person, 84 and yet there existed "the grave problem of the responsible functions of public officials being usurped by the agents of private corporations." 85 The precise boundary between self-defense and illegitimate force was not specified. Moreover, some observers, including public police chiefs, conceded that private police were a necessary evil to be tolerated because public officers could not be everywhere. It is commonly known in all parts of this country that the Pinkerton Detective Agency has assumed the functions of a private army. In all States and at all times it assumes to do that which is peculiarly the power of Government or of the State. . . . The liberties of large classes of people are threatened when individuals and corporations, without any sanction of law, are permitted to take and hold in custody without warrant of law such as they may choose to arrest. Q. And so far as these men are concerned you would rather favor their employment?-A. Yes, sir. It is impossible to provide a police force large enough to meet all the wants of business, and it is well enough to have an agency, reliable, to seek out and furnish, for business men, only reliable watchers.
S. Rep. No. 52-1280, at xi (1893).
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D. The Apparent Retreat of Private Policing
By the time of the Second World War, private police had not disappeared, but they received little of the public hostility they had experienced before. 87 Those private agencies that had once provided coal and steel companies with private police now did so for defense contractors concerned both with petty theft and international, rather than domestic, espionage. 88 Companies that entered into defense contracts with the Department of Defense, like Pratt and Whitney Aircraft and the Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA), 89 were required to establish security plans that the Federal Bureau of Investigation helped to create. 90 At its Cleveland, Ohio steel works, the Jones and Laughlin Corporation employed in 1943 seventy-two "plant protection employees" deputized by the city of Cleveland. 91 In deciding a labor dispute involving Jones and Laughlin and its private police force, the Supreme Court observed that "[i]t is a common practice in this country for private watchmen or guards to be vested with the powers of policemen, sheriffs or peace officers to protect the private property of their private employers."
92 Not all private police were stationed at industrial plants. Small agencies continued to provide guards to businesses, and private detectives dredged up incriminating evidence for spurned spouses. 93 After the war, some returning sol-87. Shearing describes the 1950s as a time when private policing "was considered an anachronistic institution," Shearing, supra note 7, at 408, reprinted in Modern Policing, supra note 7, at 408, but considering the continued employment of private policing by defense contractors and other employers this observation is overstated.
88 diers even made use of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act to finance and to "establish police services outside the realm of public police forces." 94 No further controversies on the scale of Homestead, however, surfaced.
(One notable exception was the employment in 1967 of the Wackenhut Corporation by then-Florida Governor Claude R. Kirk, Jr., to "drive organized crime out of [Florida] ."
95 During its four month existence, Wackenhut's group arrested twenty-three people and opened five hundred investigations. While the Republican Kirk counted among the group's successes the elimination of a $780,000-a-year narcotics operation, 96 one report suggested that the majority of those investigated by the Wackenhut police were Democratic state officials. After vocal opposition by the Florida public police and several state legislators, Kirk abolished his private police force, and requested instead $1.5 million from the state legislature to establish a special state police force.
)
In the meantime, public policing had been undergoing its own changes. Beginning in the Progressive era, reformers 99 introduced into these quasi-military bureaucracies 100 legalistic and professional norms. 101 Many police chiefs gained tenure and thereby acquired greater freedom from the influence of local politics. 102 Newly established police academies offered formal training to recruits.
103
No less important was the introduction of technological advances-the patrol car, the two-way radio, and the telephone (and later the computer)-that trans- formed patrol work by allowing quick responses to citizen complaints by means of a centralized dispatch. 104 A new sociology of the police emerged as well, but it omitted study of the private police. 105 
II. Private Police as Partners
A. Federal Studies of Private Policing
If at mid-century the private police appeared to be experiencing a modest decline (both in demand and employment), then new research in the 1970s raised questions about the accuracy of that view and the likely future for private police. Beginning in the 1970s, the Department of Justice sponsored a series of reports on private policing 106 that were noteworthy in two respects. As an empirical matter, it turned out that private policing had not only continued to prosper in the second half of the twentieth century, but was now outpacing the public police in employment and expenditure. Perhaps more importantly, these reports first encourage and then display a change in attitude by public police chiefs, lawmakers, and other public officials about private policing, and provide a vocabulary to describe that shift. Rather than pose a threat to public police, private police, according to these reports, could serve as the public sector's new partner.
The reports first show in plain numbers how private policing had grown, unnoticed, at a dramatic rate in the 1960s and 1970s. 107 The Hallcrest Report of 1990, commissioned by the Department of Justice, records not only this development, but also predicts that private police employment would continue to outpace that of public police well into the future, contradicting the predictions of a 1971 study issued by the Rand Corporation. 108 According to the authors of the Hallcrest Report, private police employees would outnumber public police by a ratio of 2.8:1 by the year 2000.
109
While the Rand Report was wrong on the pace of private police growth, it was probably the first major national study of several to suggest that private police could serve as a resource for public policing. 110 The Report assumes explicitly that private police, who perform a variety of legitimate security roles, "fill a perceived need and provide clear social benefits to their consumers and to the general public."
111 It also seeks to upend the conventional wisdom that policing is necessarily a government function. 112 Policing, according to the Report's authors, is a "service" that can be assumed either by public or private agencies.
113
While private police-some 289,000 guards and investigators in 1969-are primarily "concerned with private interests," including the "prevention and detection of crime on private property and the gathering of information for private purposes," the Rand Report nevertheless contends that most private policing is 108. The comparison concerns only private guards, but the difference between the two estimates is nevertheless noteworthy. Compare Hallcrest Report, supra note 106, at 229, with X Rand Report, supra note 106, at 17 ("By 1975, BLS projections indicate that there will be fewer combined private security workers and public guards than there will be public police"). By "public guard," the report refers to guards employed in the public sector without "peace officer" status. Rand Report, supra note 106, at 17.
109. See Hallcrest Report, supra note 106, at 229. According to the Report-which remains the most recent reliable source of figures-as of 1990, there were about 520,000 contract guards, 528,000 proprietary security personnel (personnel employed directly by a client of private policing services), 70,000 private investigators, and 2,900 "security engineers" ("employees deriving their primary income from [security] consultation fees"). Id. at 185-88. 110. Shearing, supra note 7, at 409, reprinted in Modern Policing, supra note 7, at 409 ("In retrospect, RAND's report can be identified as one of the earliest indications of the shift in political consciousness that has promoted the privatization of a whole range of services previously seen as fundamentally public." (citations omitted)).
111. Kakalik & Wildhorn, Private Police in the United States, supra note 106, at 24; see also Inst. for Local Self Gov't, Private Security and the Public Interest 101 (1974) (accepting the "assumption" that "private security provides social benefits to the general community as well as to the users of security services").
112. This challenged conventional research on the police that drew from Max Weber's definition of the state as having a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. "complementary" to public policing. 114 The problems within private policing identified in the Report-such as the unnecessary use of force and dishonest business practices-are not fundamental faults inherent to private policing, but technical issues amenable to improved regulation. 115 Private police, in the view supported by the Rand Report, could serve as supplements, or "junior partners," to the public police, a shift in perspective accomplished by "blurring the line between 'self-defense' and peacekeeping." 116 Thus, individual examples of private protection, in the aggregate, contribute to general public safety. Similarly, a 1974 study, conducted by the Institute for Local Self Government (ILSF) and sponsored by California's Council of Criminal Justice, states that the private police perform work that the regular police cannot or will not perform. The public police typically cannot be spared to prevent or to investigate certain suspected but unauthenticated crimes such as employee pilferage and, by law, they must refrain from crime prevention activities on private property unless asked to do so by the owner in specific instances.
117
In this view, private police do not usurp public authority, but provide muchneeded aid to the public police.
Later studies took the additional step of suggesting that private police ought to be considered equal partners with the public police, rather than subordinates supplying a complementary service. The 1990 Hallcrest Report, for instance, identifies the "coproduction of security" as a goal to be met together by "public 114. Id. at 11, 16, 18. A 1974 study of private policing in California also describes the roles of public and private as "complementary [rather than] competitive." Inst. for Local Self Gov't, supra note 111, at 86; see also Nat'l Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 27, at 19 (stating that "[i]deally, public law enforcement and private security agencies should work closely together, because their respective roles are complementary in the effort to control crime. Indeed, the magnitude of the Nation's crime problem should preclude any form of competition between the two.").
115. law enforcement, private security, and citizens." 118 What was clear by 1990-that private police outnumbered public police-was not an occasion for alarm, according to the Report's authors, but an opportunity for the "realignment of roles and greater cooperation between the public and private sectors."
119 Consequently, the "traditional approach" of public police "working independently of citizens and businesses [would have to] change." 120 Public police would not only have to work more with these groups, but also reinvent themselves as "brokers" of security resources.
121 Through these redefinitions, these reports challenged the premise that "policing" was primarily a government service.
122
B. Changing Public Police Attitudes
The vocabulary of partnership also found support in the public police community, but not without initial resistance. The California Institute for Local Self Government, for example, found in its 1974 survey of 158 public police and sheriff's departments considerable reluctance about creating formal partnerships with private police agencies, chiefly because of concerns about the quality of private police employees. 123 Similarly, a 1971 national survey reported that 40 percent of public police described their relationship with private security as only "fair" and 5 percent as "poor. Minnesota study] indicated that their attitudes toward the private police system are more positive at best, to ambivalent at least, while no one interviewed indicated that he had favorable attitudes toward and cooperative relationships with all private agents.").
Advocates of partnership, like the Private Security Advisory Council established by the Department of Justice in 1977, attributed suspicion of the public police toward private police to "role conflict." 125 In the Council's view, the blame for role conflict rested squarely with the public police, who were preoccupied with perceived threats to their status, and who failed to see that private and public police were "both directed toward protective functions in society."
126
Public police chiefs disposed toward partnerships took two approaches to overcome these suspicions. Some, like Michael Shanahan, a "private sector liaison" for the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and police chief of the University of Washington, suggested that public police should not fight the inevitable dominance of private policing in controlling crime: "The preferences of public law enforcement officials are no longer a controlling factor in these developments."
127 Others emphasized the positive effects of enhancing public police power through public-private alliances, by tapping formerly unavailable resources (increased patrols), and by public police incorporation of private sector skills ("management by objectives"). 128 According to one Los Angeles Police Department sergeant, "It's not that [the public police are] lazy, there aren't enough of us to go around."
129 Similarly, in the view of Major Paul Fitzgerald, of the Providence, Rhode Island Police, partnerships present a "win-win situation for all of us."
130 Through a reinterpretation of their role and capabilities, many of the threats once associated with the private police had been neutralized.
C. The Advocacy of Partnerships
By the end of the 1990s, the agenda for public police reform included publicprivate partnerships. port published by the Department of Justice, "Operation Cooperation," counts sixty cooperative programs throughout the country, and suggests that "[n]o city or metropolitan area should be without at least one." 131 These programs vary in size and objectives, ranging from the thirty members of the Northeast Florida Law Enforcement and Private Security Council that share information on retail theft, to the one thousand-member New York Area Police/Private Security Liaison that established a business crime squad in midtown Manhattan. 132 The private members of these alliances vary as well. Some are contract security companies and corporate police departments; others are private corporations themselves (that contract with private police agencies or employ their own). 133 Whatever their identity, private members all share the same goals of promoting partnership with public police departments. 134 Some examples are discussed below.
Joint Investigations
For some public police departments, the increased acceptability of partnerships has led to their greater willingness to enter into joint investigations with private police, both by lending public personnel, as well as by providing administrative and technical resources. Gary Marx discusses one such example: a sting conducted by the FBI and IBM that targeted the theft of technological trade secrets. 135 The investigation began when a former employee informed IBM that he had been approached by the Hitachi Corporation about obtaining confidential computer information. 136 After meeting with IBM security officers, the em-ployee introduced Hitachi officials to members of "Glenmar Associates," a fictitious consulting firm created by IBM and the FBI (which had been informed later of the proposed corporate espionage) that offered to sell IBM secrets to Hitachi. As a result of their joint undercover work, criminal charges were eventually filed against twenty-one people in 1982, including senior officials at Hitachi and at the Mitsubishi Electric Corporation. The defendants were accused of, among other things, paying $648,000 to an undercover FBI agent in exchange for the stolen information. William H. Webster, then-director of the FBI, praised IBM "for the excellent assistance rendered during this investigation." 137 
Information-Sharing Networks
Many partnerships also provide a formal means to share information on crime patterns and suspects. While we know little about the history of these relationships, former public police officials in the private sector probably have long relied on their public police contacts for information. 138 What is different about contemporary partnerships is their formal, public nature; these partnerships exist with the imprimatur of the public police department's official face, and by extension, the approval of a city, a state, or the federal government.
These groups typically have three purposes. First, they share from their respective departments information on crime patterns, suspects, 139 and identification of "criminogenic" 140 situations such as demonstrations. 141 Second, many partnerships, such as the Business/Law Enforcement Alliance of California, target particular categories of crime such as check fraud that concern their private members and ask the public police members of the partnership for assistance.
142
Finally, regular meetings and personal contacts among private police executives and public police representatives circulate tokens of a common policing culture: "informal networks, similar tasks, and the exchange of personnel."
143
In one example, the shipping company FedEx recently convinced legislators in Tennessee, where it is headquartered, to amend state law so that FedEx could employ its own, ten-person sworn police force. 144 This means that FedEx police may now "investigate all types of crimes, request search warrants and make arrests anywhere in the state." 145 Although FedEx had long employed its own private police force, 146 the state's conferral of peace officer status on the FedEx police department allows the company to occupy a seat on a regional task force run by the FBI. 147 Membership on the task force permits FedEx to receive "more sensitive and specific information regarding terrorist threats than businesses usually receive." 148 Some partnerships also operate in virtual space. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the perceived vulnerability of the nation's telephone lines, gas pipelines, and transport systems-nearly all of which are privately owned-
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An example of one such partnership is the special Center City District (CCD) in Philadelphia, established in 1991. 155 The 2,087 property owners within the District, representing the city's highest concentration of hotels, stores, banks, and office buildings, pay a 5 percent property tax surcharge. This pays for the employment of forty-five to fifty private patrol officers. The CCD private police, who carry no weapons and who do not possess peace officer powers, patrol the district in "beats." The Philadelphia Police Department receives no special funds from the District but nevertheless has contributed sixty additional public officer posts to the District. Both groups of police work out of the same police substation located within the district. Thomas Seamon, deputy police commissioner of the Philadelphia Police Department, credited this "merging of public police and private security" with a 6-percent decrease in crime in a twelvemonth period.
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III. The Changed Discourse on Private Policing
By the end of the twentieth century, private policing had gained new respectability from the government and the public police. To be sure, there remained dissenting views that were less sanguine about the role of private policing. In 1971, the Berkeley Center for Research and Justice raised doubts that private police would "provide any lasting solution to the fear and insecurity that have come to dominate U.S. cities," and further suggested that security guard employment could only exacerbate already strained urban race relations. 157 Civil liberties groups like the American Civil Liberties Union have consistently questioned the desirability of private police employment from their use in strikebreaking to the present day. 158 And, their popularity notwithstanding, a number of business improvement districts have faced lawsuits accusing their
The second half of the twentieth century saw, as I have discussed elsewhere, 165 many Western democracies caught in a dilemma. Faced with persistently high crime rates, public officials responsible for criminal law policies and expenditures saw the need to qualify a fundamental and implicit promise of modern government: to guarantee safety and security to its citizens. That qualification took two approaches. One took the form of careful but deliberate statements that government could not be expected alone to guarantee protection from crime. 166 Another was the transformation of a longstanding skepticism toward private policing into public approval and the encouragement of partnerships.
These public-private partnerships, now unquestionably an important crime control approach in the United States, rest upon assumptions whose implications have not yet been fully explored. First, it is presumed that partnerships share common objectives. 167 Private police agencies, however, can play a significant role in shaping the definition and scope of the projects they wish to target with public aid.
Consider the advocacy of the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition, Inc. (IACC), an organization representing "exclusively the interests of companies concerned with IP [intellectual property] enforcement," 168 which presented testimony to the International Relations Committee of the House of Representatives. Concerned that product counterfeiting and piracy constituted "very low law enforcement priorities after September 11, 2001," IACC president Timothy Trainer argued that counterfeiting often provided sources of funding to terrorists. 169 In the organization's view, public support for the IACC's goals of policing counterfeit jeans and handbags will "aid in the battle against terrorism and also the nature of private policing. Universities offer a good example. Yet many privately policed places are poor analogues for the state-citizen relationship, and the number of these "commercial communities" is considerable.
My discussion of these two assumptions is only a preliminary one, and their resolution will require careful consideration over time, as partnerships become ever more popular. What is striking, however, is that even in embryonic form, these concerns hardly register in discussions about partnerships, which, as the prior sections suggest, are typically presented with unalloyed enthusiasm.
And it is clear that private police have assumed an even greater importance in the post-9/11 world than would have been projected even in the early 1990s. President Bush's 2003 National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, for example, identifies private security guards as "an important source of protection for critical facilities." 174 Because much of the nation's "critical infrastructure"-including its energy producers, banking and finance operations, and transportation systems-are privately owned, private police are "viewed by many," including the Bush Administration, "as both a vital element of terror deterrence and the first line of response to terrorist attacks." 175 The states are equally supportive of training private police as "private counterterrorism agents." 176 
Conclusion
Contemporary appeals to partnership between private and public police are striking because they harbor little of the deep-seated suspicion directed against private police in the period after the Civil War and until the Cold War. Yet these police filled real needs. As U.S. cities slowly established public police departments in the nineteenth century, people relied upon private detectives and pa-
